

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 5 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

(United States of America)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

JUN 20 1966

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. C.S. JHA  
Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI  
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV  
Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE  
Mr. L.D. WEILER  
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the two hundred and fifty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

We are honoured to have with us today His Excellency Mr. Chandra Shekhar Jha, the Foreign Secretary of India. Mr. Jha is no stranger to many of us. I know that I speak on behalf of all members of this Committee in extending a very warm welcome to him.

I should like to note, in my capacity as representative of the United States, that one of our most prominent Senatorial advisers, Mr. Stuart Symington, is also observing our deliberations today.

I understand that Mr. Jha, the Foreign Secretary of India, would like to make a statement to the Committee and, with the agreement of the representatives whose names are on the list of speakers, I now call on him.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you for your kind words of welcome.

I am not here to participate in the deliberations of this Committee. That is being done in ample measure by our representative here, Mr. Trivedi. I am here to get the feel, so to speak, of this Committee, to learn, to make personal contact with some of you and, above all, to present myself as a token of proof of the great importance that my Government attaches to the deliberations of this Committee.

I have just visited some of the great capitals of the world, accompanying my Prime Minister, who has been in the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Everywhere the question of disarmament was among the matters uppermost in the minds of those with whom we had discussions. In particular, the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequent urgency of reaching an agreement on the non-proliferation of such weapons were discussed.

I found much hope and faith in the deliberations of this Committee, and certainly a universal acceptance of the Committee's importance. Progress on disarmament has been slow, but this has been inevitable because of the complexity of the problems. Nevertheless, we have the feeling that some progress has been made and that the Committee's deliberations have not been unfruitful.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament can take the credit for stimulating in abundant measure the conclusion of the Moscow partial test-ban.

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Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). It is true that that treaty was not negotiated in this Committee; but it may be said that it was a direct result of the very profound deliberations that took place, the contacts that were established and the mutual understandings that were reached in this Committee.

We think that some progress has also been registered on non-proliferation, the topic that absorbs us all at the present moment because of the obvious dangers presented by the possibility that many countries in the world have or will have the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons. The fact that the Committee is giving earnest and serious consideration to various proposals is in itself a sign of progress.

The concrete proposals which have been submitted to the Committee by the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with the supplements and revisions that have been made from time to time (ENDC/152 and Add.1, ENDC/164); the memorandum of the non-aligned nations of 15 September 1965 (ENDC/158); General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161); and various other ideas and suggestions that have come out of the discussions and contacts in this Committee seem to us to be signs of progress toward the goal of a non-proliferation treaty. In this connexion I was struck by the remarkable statement made by the Foreign Minister of Sweden on 23 March 1966 in the Swedish Parliament.

The currents and cross-currents of thought represented in the proposals and statements provide the possibility of finding an acceptable basis for a non-proliferation treaty. In saying that, I do not minimize the differences and the gaps that still divide the various points of view. But, although we admit that there are still a large number of differences and difficulties and very large gaps, we think that it is by the process of discussion and further discussion that we can reach an acceptable basis for a non-proliferation treaty. Such a basis must be found because the hopes of the world are pinned on the deliberations of this Committee. If the world is to be safe for the future, for our children and their children, agreement has to be reached. We feel that with patience with perseverance, and with the earnestness and dedication that the members of the Committee have demonstrated time and again in these deliberations, a generally-acceptable basis for a non-proliferation treaty will be found.

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I do not wish to go into substantive details. Our representative, Mr. Trivedi, is deeply involved in these and has from time to time presented our point of view to the Committee and to the United Nations General Assembly. I do not wish to encroach upon his domain. Whatever I say is said in ignorance, because I know that this problem is extremely complicated. We at "headquarters" are overwhelmed by the expertise of our representatives on this Committee.

My Government has high hopes that discussions in this Committee, supplemented and aided by intensive discussions in the capitals of the countries represented in the Committee -- and I think that the stage has arrived when discussions in the capitals have become very necessary to supplement what is being done here -- will result in the success of the present endeavours to find a basis for a non-proliferation treaty. We do not think that the gaps are unbridgeable, and every effort must be made to see that we reach our desired goal.

I have ventured to say a few words about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the subject which is uppermost in the minds of the members of the Committee at present. But we must never forget that the tasks of this Committee are very wide, fairly distant and very profound. There can be no other goal but that of general and complete disarmament, to which the United Nations and the whole of humanity is committed; and, if I may say so, all nations -- at least, all nations in this Committee -- are engaged in finding a solution to that problem. That goal should never be lost sight of. Even a non-proliferation treaty will be only a milestone in the progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to pay a warm tribute to you and to the members of the Committee on behalf of my Government, and to wish you all God-speed.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): On behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I should like to express the gratitude of this Committee to the distinguished Foreign Secretary of India for his remarks.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, it is, first of all, my pleasant task to congratulate the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on its great new triumph in the peaceful conquest of space. It takes us back in memory to that quite recent time, not yet nine years ago, when the

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Soviet Union launched the earth's first artificial satellite. After that came the first flight in outer space, again by a Soviet airman. Then there was the first group flight in space -- by Soviet citizens. And then, in the person of a Soviet cosmonaut -- man took his first walk in outer space. And now the moon has its first satellite: Soviet, and musical as well! This, to my mind, is really an achievement to be hailed with delight by the whole of progressive mankind. And remember, it has all been done with peaceful ends in mind. Once again, let me congratulate the Soviet delegation on this magnificent scientific, technical and -- may I say? -- political achievement.

Mr. Chairman, the progress of our discussion on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons unequivocally brings us to the following conclusions. First, that most of the delegations in the Committee, in full accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) of the United Nations General Assembly and with the interests of the international community, consider that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must bar all paths -- whether direct or indirect -- for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that its provisions must be set out in clear and concrete terms as a responsibility of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike. Secondly, that of the two draft treaties on this question which are before the Committee, the USSR draft treaty represents the more exact and complete fulfilment of the task laid down for us by resolution 2028 (XX).

Our delegation has already had occasion (ENDC/PV.243, pp.19 et seq.) to make some comments on the United States draft treaty. Many of the delegates in the Committee, representatives of the socialist and non-aligned countries, have made serious criticisms of this document, which was also subjected to a detailed analysis by the Soviet delegation, on 29 March last (ENDC/252). As has been pointed out on more than one occasion, the gravest and most dangerous shortcoming of the United States draft treaty lies in the fact that it does not answer the requirements of paragraph 2(a) of resolution 2028 (XX), that it is not in accordance with the first principle of the resolution, that the non-proliferation treaty "should be void of any loop-holes". The United States, by arguing that "national control" is the only form of proliferation of nuclear weapons, is deliberately leaving the

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door open for the proliferation of such weapons through multilateral control. In essence the United States draft aims at only a limited ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons; this amounts to permitting a certain amount of proliferation, since it is quite indisputable that, if something is partially prohibited, then it is also partially permitted.

The Western countries have devoted much effort to proving that the General Assembly, when it adopted resolution 2028 (XX), envisaged the first principle (paragraph 2 (a)) as meaning the same thing as what the United States and its allies based their concept of "national control" -- that is, on a partial solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is clear for all to see however, that such was not the wish of the vast majority of States in the United Nations. The text of the resolution, and of paragraph 2(a) in particular, provides for a total, not a partial, ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The words "national control" are not used anywhere in the resolution.

But it is not only the text of the resolution which points to the half-way nature of the United States draft. By its very nature, the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons does not admit of any stage-by-stage, partial or in any way incomplete solution. If the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be the important instrument which we all seem to think it should be for reaching agreement on other measures of disarmament, then the problem of non-proliferation must be solved radically: all the paths, channels and loop-holes through which non-nuclear-weapon States might obtain access to such weapons, either by bringing them under their own ownership, disposal and control, or by participation in collective ownership, disposal and control within the framework of military alliances, must be hermetically sealed. It is just such a comprehensive solution of the problem which is proposed in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164).

In this connexion I should like to refer back to what was said at our meeting of 22 February by Ambassador Abera, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, who has correctly interpreted the essence of the problem:



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"I shall not take the precious time of the Committee to dwell further on the semantics of the terms used, but it can be seen clearly that non-proliferation within a group as much as outside the group is the intention of the Soviet draft, whereas the draft of the United States safeguards from independent national control." (ENDC/PV.242, p.17).

After so many delegations had levelled serious criticisms at the United States draft, the United States might have been expected to make the appropriate changes in its original proposal (ENDC/152), in order to repair its shortcomings. Our expectations were, however, only half fulfilled. In other words, changes have been suggested but the shortcomings remain.

The Bulgarian delegation has carefully studied the new United States proposal (ENDC/152/Add.1), which contains some amendments to the original United States draft treaty. The first thing that strikes the eye is that the authors are trying to give the impression that the new proposal comes close to the Soviet draft treaty, that it represents some progress towards bringing the positions of the sides closer together.

We have already witnessed attempts by the representatives of some Western countries to turn our discussion into an analysis of individual terms, with the hope of masking in this way the serious shortcomings of the United States draft treaty. In the new United States proposal we see a repetition of the same tactics. Efforts are made in this document to show that it is a compromise, a step in the direction of the Soviet draft treaty; but the United States draft treaty remains essentially the same, and it is still therefore a half-way measure. While some clauses in the expanded United States draft treaty add still more precision to the ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons into national control, they do not alter the limited nature of the ban, for which even without these amendments there was provision in the original United States draft.

I should like to dwell particularly on the ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of any association of non-nuclear Powers. As can be seen, this wording in the United States proposal concerns only associations of Powers not possessing nuclear weapons; it therefore deliberately excludes from the scope of the

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treaty just those associations in which lies the greatest danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons: associations in which nuclear Powers participate. In practice this means that, if the United States draft were adopted, it would be possible in, let us say, NATO, as well as in the other Western alliances, to transfer nuclear weapons into collective control without a formal violation of the treaty.

In the new United States proposal we find some development of this idea — a development which, alas, does not bring us closer to but takes us farther from the possibility of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The general and somewhat vague wording of the original United States draft has been replaced by an open and unequivocal legalization of the possibility of proliferating nuclear weapons within the framework of the Western military alliance, NATO. What in the old draft was a point requiring explanation has become in the new draft a self-evident fact.

It was probably with a view to removing any doubts about this that you, Mr. Chairman, made the following statement at our meeting of 22 March:

"I should like [to point out] that, where a nuclear weapon State retains a veto over any use of nuclear weapons, there is no problem of transfer of control. That is because no additional State and no association of States gains the right or ability to take, on its own, a decision to use nuclear weapons. Neither would have the ability to start a nuclear war. That terrible decision remains in the hands of the existing nuclear weapon States, and no question of transfer of control even arises".

(ENDC/PV.250, p.10)

This makes it perfectly clear that the United States draft does not exclude the possibility of new Powers acquiring the material ability to conduct a war; those countries are merely to be deprived of the right to start such war. In other words, such Powers will not have a legal right to take, on their own, "a decision to use nuclear weapons"; (ibid.) and in order to start a war they will have to seek the permission of the existing nuclear Powers within the framework of their military alliances. But this in no sense means that they will not have the material ability to wage such a war, in other words, that nuclear weapons will not be placed at their disposal within the framework of military alliances.

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But is it not clear that a country which has the "conditional" possibility of having nuclear weapons at its disposal may easily, at a moment convenient to itself, convert this possibility into an "unconditional" one? Here, obviously, the mere veto of the weapon's owner is insufficient. A non-proliferation treaty must exclude the possibility of new Powers obtaining any kind of access to nuclear weapons, and not merely make their right to use - such weapons subject to appropriate authorization from "existing nuclear Powers".

In submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee its draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the United States, while eloquently declaring that it is doing so on the grounds that non-proliferation is necessary, wishes to reserve to itself the right to alter unilaterally the limits of non-proliferation within the framework of its military alliances, in accordance of course with its own interests, and with the help of the proposed "veto". The Soviet delegation has very properly drawn attention to this state of affairs. We are convinced that in the view of most Powers a future treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons requires no guarantees whatever of the "veto" type, and that its guarantee to all peoples will be based solely on the firm closure of any possible loop-holes for proliferation.

The United States doctrine on national control, which is clearly expressed in the definition given in the new document (ENDC/152/Add.1, article IV(c)) provides for a limited, incomplete prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since it makes no reference to cases of participation in the ownership, disposal and use of nuclear weapons within the framework of multilateral control over them. Such would be, for example, the position of the Federal Republic of Germany if multilateral Atlantic or analogous organizations were set up with the aim of sharing nuclear responsibility--to use the terminology now current -- within the framework of the NATO military alliance. It was just this possibility which was stressed again by none other than the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note of March this year, which contained the following statement:

"Within the framework of this alliance [NATO] it [the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany] advocates, together with other allies, that all parties to it should ... share in the responsibility for nuclear defence". (p.6)

For the same reason the Note expresses support for a ban on the transfer of nuclear control "into the national control of other Powers".

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From what has been said so far it is clear that in the new United States draft the possibility of the Federal Republic of Germany or other non-nuclear Powers obtaining access to nuclear weapons through participation in multilateral control over them not only remains fully open but is even given legal sanction, despite the assurances which we are given by the Western Powers concerning the veto. Does not this mean that a special status and privileges will be created for the non-nuclear NATO Powers and, in particular, for the Federal Republic of Germany? Yes, it does mean that; and this was confirmed by Lord Chalfont, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, when he said on 1 March that --

"... it is surely natural, especially in the circumstances still prevailing in Central Europe, which has been the cockpit of so many disastrous wars, that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should want to have some say in the use of the forces of that alliance .... Is it unreasonable that the collective forces of NATO should include nuclear weapons to match those deployed against the alliance?" (ENDC/PV.244, p.12).

In this and similar statements by the Western delegations it is not difficult to see an effort by the Western Powers to protect their nuclear alliances from the effects of a non-proliferation treaty, and to present as an expression of democracy in NATO the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons which would occur within the framework of that alliance if the United States draft was adopted.

The same effort by the United States to set its military alliances outside the scope of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is evident, too, in the statement made by you, Mr. Chairman, on 31 March, in which you invited us to reckon with the "political realities" of the world in which we are living (ENDC/PV.253, p.14). This concept of "political realities" apparently covers not only the present situation in the Western military alliances set up by the United States and its allies, but also future plans for the so-called "sharing of nuclear

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responsibility" within the NATO framework. And no doubt the revanchist claims so clearly expressed in the latest Note by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and, in particular, the desire of that Government to obtain access to nuclear weapons, are also "political realities".

But this is exactly why those who cherish peace and the interests of the peoples insist the more firmly on prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Did we not all, when we voted for resolution 2028 (XX), agree that a treaty on non-proliferation should be a step towards general and complete disarmament, that is towards an active change for the better in the present reality, and not towards increased tension in the world and the armaments race, which would inevitably be the result of the "realism" recommended by the delegation of the United States?

I shall venture to recall that, besides the facts which Mr. Fisher has in mind, there are others which the Western delegations ignore: the existence, for example, of the alliance of States belonging to the Warsaw Pact, of which the German Democratic Republic, too, is a member. But that alliance has clearly expressed its determination to achieve the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons with, in the initial stages, a ban on proliferation, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and other measures, familiar to all, for promoting peaceful coexistence amongst all Powers. The proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries are still valid, and it is only the countries of NATO, headed by the United States of America, which do not accept them.

In the case in point, all the members of the Warsaw Pact support the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union. This treaty would reserve no special privileges for any association of States or for any individual State. This is the political reality which the Western delegations should bear in mind when discussing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our delegation is convinced that we should not change the status of the States which

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do not at present possess nuclear weapons, whether it be the Federal Republic of Germany or any other Power.

Nor can we fail to note the inconsistency of the Western delegations' defence of a partial proliferation of nuclear weapons through their defence of the right of every member of their military alliance to participate in the settlement of questions relating to the use of nuclear weapons. NATO, it seems, has embarked on non-proliferation -- a fact which, by the way, everyone has long since recognized. Apart from the compliment which NATO's own members are paying to the organization, can any attention at all be given to the argument that, when a problem like that of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is under consideration, an effort should be made to find out whether or not this course is agreeable to a particular military alliance?

We have already pointed to several positive elements in the draft treaty of the United States of America. But all these elements are to be found in the draft treaty submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and the Soviet draft also contains a whole series of other important provisions which lack the organic deficiencies of the United States document. That is why we think it would be more appropriate for the Committee to concentrate without further ado on the Soviet draft.

Let us look again at article I of the USSR draft treaty. In the first place, its contents show clearly that the possibility of acquiring control over nuclear weapons, whether directly or indirectly, is completely denied, not only to all non-nuclear Powers, but also to any group of Powers; while the United States draft, on the other hand, admits that such a transfer of control could take place in the future. Furthermore, article I of the Soviet document forbids parties to accord the right to participate in the ownership and disposal of nuclear weapons, while the United States draft allows for this possibility.

The second paragraph of the same sub-article of the Soviet draft provides that nuclear Powers parties to the treaty --

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"... shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their emplace<sup>ment</sup> and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance". (ENDC/164)

In our opinion this provision is of very great importance, for it is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of any mixed forces in which contingents of non-nuclear countries participate. We find a similar provision, too, in article I paragraph 4 of the United States draft treaty. Its significance, however, is quite different from that of the Soviet draft, since it is subordinated to the argument of national control and is already restricted by the preceding paragraphs of the article. This means in effect that the transfer of nuclear weapons to units of the armed forces or military personnel is only prohibited if it "would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons".

In submitting this text the Western Powers require us to agree that if, for example, the West German army or that of another non-nuclear Power represented in multilateral or similar nuclear forces within the NATO framework has nuclear weapons at its disposal, this does not constitute a proliferation of nuclear weapons. We cannot agree with this suggestion, for the simple reason that it runs contrary to logic, to common sense and to the interests of peace.

That is why, even in its second wording, the United States draft treaty cannot serve as a basis for our work. No basic changes whatever have been made, and the draft therefore does not correspond to the task we have been set, which is to prepare a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would not sanction any privileged military nuclear alliances, privileged nations, share-holders in nuclear weapons or mixed nuclear armed forces under one command today and another tomorrow; in other words, a treaty which for the time being -- that is to say, until the next

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steps have been taken towards the total destruction of nuclear weapons -- would place the present owners of nuclear weapons in a sort of glass case, under the watchful gaze of all mankind. Such, in our opinion, should be a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all to welcome here amongst us His Excellency, Mr. Jha, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of India. It is a particular pleasure for me to welcome Mr. Jha, for he is an eminent Indian statesman with whom I have ties of profound respect and liking resulting from close and friendly co-operation in United Nations bodies.

May I also be permitted to express the sincere gratitude of the Soviet delegation to Ambassador Lukanov, the representative of Bulgaria, for his congratulations on the new great scientific and technical achievement of the Soviet Union represented by the creation of an artificial satellite of the moon? As reported by Tass, this step has been taken with the object of exploring the circumlunar cosmic space; and it is therefore an outstanding contribution by our country to space science, a contribution to the achievement of mankind as a whole in this field of knowledge, which has been enriched in recent years by major discoveries of universal and historic importance.

I shall now pass immediately to that part of our statement which was prepared for today. In our statement today we should like, in the light of the exchange of opinions that has taken place on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to continue our observations, adding to what we have said at earlier meetings of the Committee. We should also like to make some observations on what is hindering our progress towards the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is all the more essential because the examination by the Eighteen-Nation Committee of the problem of



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non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has not yet resulted in any progress towards a solution of this important and urgent disarmament problem.

In this connexion we deem it necessary to point out, first, that the main obstacle to a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the endeavour of the United States to achieve a solution which would conform to the aims and purposes of its policy in NATO, the efforts of the United States to satisfy the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany for nuclear weapons, and the intention of the United States to increase its influence in NATO and to adapt NATO to an even greater extent to the demands of United States policy. For precisely this reason the United States is trying hard to keep the doors open for the proliferation of nuclear weapons among its partners in military blocs and, in the first instance, for its partners in NATO, such as the Federal Republic of Germany. That is why the fundamental idea permeating both the original and the modified United States draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152 and Add. 1) is to retain loop-holes and in fact to legalize the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances.

In attempting to harmonize and parcel together two opposite aims, namely non-proliferation of nuclear weapons outside NATO and plans for their proliferation within NATO by setting up a NATO multilateral nuclear force or a NATO Atlantic force, and also by the so-called "sharing of nuclear responsibility" within the framework of NATO, the United States is reducing consideration of the problem of non-proliferation to a most sorry state, to a state of deadlock. To combine and reconcile the two opposite aims of non-proliferation and the simultaneous proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances would seem impossible without directly violating General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161).

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The position of the United States in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons reminds us of the way in which, when the nuclear problem first arose, the United States proposed to solve the problem of banning nuclear weapons. The United States countered the Soviet proposals for complete prohibition under international control of the production, stock-piling and use of nuclear weapons by putting forward the notorious "Baruch plan", which provided, not that nuclear weapons should be banned, but that they should be transferred to an "international" organ which would have owned and continued to produce and improve nuclear weapons, and with the help of which the United States would have retained its predominant position in the nuclear field. That position of the United States was described at the time by the Soviet delegation in the United Nations as an attempt to have its cake and eat it. The United States position made it impossible at that time to solve the problem of the banning of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately a similar situation is to be seen at present. The United States wishes to secure for itself the right to spread nuclear weapons among its partners in the military blocs, and at the same time to negotiate for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons outside such blocs. Once again it is setting itself the task of having its cake and eating it; but once the cake has been eaten it no longer exists. The aim of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and that of their proliferation within military blocs are in direct contradiction.

The United States delegation, in its search for arguments with which to justify United States diplomacy in setting itself and, unfortunately, the Eighteen-Nation Committee this contradictory and in fact impossible task, is introducing into our discussion on non-proliferation problems which are, on the whole, irrelevant to our work, not conducive to a solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in fact apt to confuse and complicate the consideration of this question.

Thus as a guarantee of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States delegation is submitting for the Committee's consideration the veto which the United States is said to possess in NATO when decisions are taken on the use of nuclear weapons. The question arises, why this new problem or new element is being introduced into the consideration of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Why is an attempt being made to convince us that it is desirable or essential that the United States should retain the right of veto in decisions within NATO on matters relating to the use of nuclear weapons?

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There is, of course, a hidden intent. By introducing the veto the United States is trying to make out that the access of its allies in the military blocs to nuclear weapons is no longer so dangerous, because the United States will not in any case allow them to use the weapons. Nevertheless, the very fact that the question of the veto is raised is really a recognition by the United States that its draft treaty will actually lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; since, if those weapons did not fall into the hands of other, non-nuclear, Powers, the question of the veto would not arise. In raising the issue of the veto the United States is attempting to conceal, to camouflage in fact, the situation, which is that the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation is actually aimed at the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but that this proliferation will be controlled by the United States through the veto which it will possess in NATO when decisions are taken on the use of nuclear weapons.

What other meaning can be seen in the fact that Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, has reverted again and again, in a whole series of his statements, to the question of the United States veto in NATO, and to the fact that the United States does not intend to renounce the right of veto in any circumstances? In making this point the United States representative has quoted Mr. Rusk and other statesmen of his country.

The injection into our debate of such an element as the question of the United States veto in NATO is, at the same time, indicative of the wrong course along which the United States is trying to steer our discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the subject of non-proliferation. Instead of discussing specific articles and provisions of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are being involved in the intricacies of the internal relations within NATO which it is said will control the use of nuclear weapons by the members of this bloc. This is evidently necessary to secure our agreement to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would in fact contain loop-holes permitting proliferation of these weapons within this military bloc of the Western Powers.

Many questions arise in connexion with the United States veto when decisions are taken in NATO on the use of nuclear weapons. We may cite these questions as examples, not in order to obtain answers to them but merely to demonstrate that this whole matter of the United States veto has no relevance to a solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We might, for example, ask what the situation would be if the partners of the United States in NATO were to reject the legality of

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the United States veto at a decisive or crucial moment? What would happen if the partners of the United States in NATO were to find means of opening the lock on nuclear weapons in circumvention of the United States veto? Who would inherit the United States right of veto if NATO ceased to exist? The list of questions of this type could be extended.

The injection into our debate by the United States of an element such as its right of veto in NATO is politically and legally unjustified, and complicates our task of finding ways of solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem of the United States veto in NATO should be of concern to the United States and its partners in NATO, but not to the more than 120 States which at the present time could and should become parties to an international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Can it be seriously suggested that a vital multilateral international agreement, to which according to our calculations many States, probably even more than a hundred, could become parties, should be based on the unilateral right of veto of one of the parties to this agreement, the United States? In making such a claim the United States is completely failing to consider the real state of affairs in the world.

We should like to stress once again that neither the Soviet Union nor the many other States that do or do not take part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee can base their security on the United States right of veto on decisions within NATO relating to the use of nuclear weapons. The security of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and also that of the non-aligned States, cannot depend on any agreements whatsoever that exist or might exist within the framework of NATO. We have already noted here that, in matters relating to the use of the veto and other agreements within the framework of NATO, the United States will be guided by its own interests, and not by the interests of the security of other States -- the Soviet Union, its allies and the non-aligned countries (ENDC/PV.252, pp.9,10)

Apart from the problem of the veto, the United States has introduced into the discussion the possibility of the transformation of a nuclear Power into an association of States possessing nuclear weapons. Article I paragraph 3 of the United States draft treaty is entirely devoted to this. The question arises why such an intricate and highly hypothetical element as the question of transformation should be introduced

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into a draft treaty on non-proliferation. After all, as far as we know none of the present nuclear Powers has any intention of ceasing to exist as a nuclear Power and of transferring its entire nuclear arsenal and assets to some international military alliance. No statement to this effect has been made either in the Eighteen-Nation Committee or outside it by the government of any nuclear Power. In the light of the existing situation, therefore, the possibility of transformation is so problematical as not to be worthy of serious consideration, let alone of inclusion in the provisions of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The question arises why in these circumstances we are invited to consider this problem. What is the sense of introducing this fundamentally superfluous and unnecessary element into our discussion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? We are quite justified in raising these questions, and we should like to state our views on this subject. This element is being introduced into our discussion for the purpose of creating some sort of additional legal basis to justify the idea of the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances to which nuclear Powers are parties. The hypothetical problem of the transformation of a nuclear Power into an association of States disposing of nuclear weapons can be discussed only if we are faced with the task of justifying the need to keep open the doors through which States that are members of military alliances and blocs can obtain access to nuclear weapons. In a business-like discussion of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as defined by the General Assembly resolution, such a hypothetical problem of transformation does not arise.

Examination of these two questions, the veto of the United States within NATO and the transformation of nuclear Powers into associations of States possessing nuclear weapons, leads us straight to a consideration of the basic element in the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as advanced by the United States. This element, which is the basis of the United States concept of "limited non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons, is the "non-transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of non-nuclear Powers". In this context we would emphasize the two words "national" and "control". The purport of the United States draft treaty is to avoid increasing the number of States having "national control" over nuclear weapons.

For what purpose is the idea of non-proliferation limited to national control instead of including control in general? Furthermore, why, as the representative of Bulgaria has pointed out today, is the very concept of control interpreted only in one

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sense: as the right or ability of a State to employ nuclear weapons -- why only in the one sense? Why are such concepts as prohibition of the ownership and control of nuclear weapons, or participation in the ownership and control of nuclear weapons, excluded? Why has the whole idea of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons been cramped into the framework of restrictive formulations? Why should the United States require such significant exceptions to the rule of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as have found expression in the concept "national", and in that of "control" over only the end-result of the ownership of nuclear weapons, i.e. over the ability to employ them? According to the United States idea a State may own or control nuclear weapons and merely be unable to use them while there is a United States veto. What need is there for such a limited interpretation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?

There can be only one answer to these questions: the United States does not contemplate complete prevention of the direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it wishes to legalize the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of the military alliances it has created. It is seeking access to nuclear weapons for its military partners in NATO, and first and foremost for the Federal Republic of Germany.

The delegation of the United States is merely saying that States which do not at present possess nuclear weapons should not be able to acquire the right of ability "to unleash these weapons". At the meeting of the Committee held on 31 March Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, stated emphatically that the main task is "the prevention of any increase in the number of Powers that will be in a position to unleash nuclear weapons". (ENDC/PV.253, p.10)

The aim is merely to prevent an increase in the number of Powers that will be in a position to unleash nuclear weapons, not to prevent a widening of the circle of Powers which will have physical access to nuclear weapons, or which will have the right to participate in decisions on matters of nuclear strategy, and in decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons.

As we can all see, however, this is too narrow an interpretation of the purposes which this Committee has in view in discussing matters relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These purposes are most fully and precisely defined in resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, which calls upon us to produce a treaty which --

"... should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form...".  
(A/RES/2028 (XX), paragraph 2(a); ENDC/161).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

We see no need to depart from the requirements laid down for a treaty on non-proliferation in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with the spirit and letter of that resolution, nuclear weapons should be transferred neither to the individual nor to the collective ownership and control of non-nuclear Powers. The qualifying terms, concepts and formulations introduced by the United States are contrary to the concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and contrary to the task which we, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, are vainly trying to carry out: to eliminate the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It cannot be denied that the participation of a non-nuclear State in the joint ownership of nuclear weapons, and in the political solution of the problem of their proliferation, is a step from which it will be easy to take the next step and become a nuclear Power in the full sense of the term. The first step will inevitably be followed by the second. The facts indicate that it is just this path of "nuclear escalation" that the present ruling circles of West Germany are preparing to follow. Mr. von Hassel, the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, openly stated in November last year that West Germany will not be satisfied until it, too, possesses nuclear weapons.

The draft treaty on non-proliferation and the subsequent amendments submitted by the United States for the Committee's consideration (ENDC/152 and Add.1) inevitably suggest the conclusion that the main purpose of their draftsmen is to protect NATO and the other United States military alliances from the effect of a possible treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is indicated both by the whole content of the United States draft treaty and the new amendments to it, and by the United States delegation's introduction into our discussion on this matter of a number of elements which are basically quite irrelevant to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I have in mind the question of the United States veto in NATO, and that of the transformation of a nuclear Power into an association of States possessing nuclear weapons.

A different approach to that proposed by the United States is needed for solving the problem of non-proliferation. First of all, it is essential to abandon all attempts to give access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States, including those that are members of Western military blocs. It is essential that the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be considered restrictively but solved in full conformity with the requirements of the United Nations General Assembly as expressed in its resolution 2028 (XX).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In this connexion we should like to point out that one of the features of the Soviet draft treaty is precisely that it does not place any restrictions on the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The wording is direct and precise: not to transfer such weapons in any form -- directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States -- to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons, and not to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. In contrast to the United States proposals, our Soviet proposals on non-proliferation do not prescribe the examination of any matters relating to a veto, either of the USSR or of the United States or of any other country, since no need for it arises or can arise. The Soviet draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons fully guarantees that none of the non-nuclear States could "unleash nuclear weapons", however much it might wish to do so, for the simple reason that it will not possess these weapons and will not have any access to them. These weapons will be, as it were, beyond the reach of non-nuclear States, whether they belong to military blocs with nuclear Powers or not. We have every basis for the assertion that this will be the best and most effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons by such a State.

In conclusion, the delegation of the USSR would like to emphasize that the Soviet Union is greatly interested in the speediest solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his report to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee, cited the problem which is occupying the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the present time as one of the most important measures for improving the international situation, strengthening peace and promoting international co-operation between the peoples. In his report he indicated that the following were some of the steps that needed to be taken:

"The conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the complete exclusion of the question of the nuclear rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany or its access to nuclear weapons in any form; the execution of the peoples' wish for the setting-up of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; the assumption by States possessing nuclear weapons of a solemn obligation not to be the first to use them; the conclusion of an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear explosions. If put into execution, these measures, which are directed against the threat of a nuclear war, would clear the way for further advance towards the complete banning and destruction of nuclear weapons."



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In this connexion we should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union does not regard a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a single, isolated measure, but merely as a step along the road to the complete banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. It is this that the peoples of all countries demand.

Mr. TOZZOLI (Italy) (translation from French): Since there is still some time left this morning, I should like, on behalf of the Italian delegation, to offer a few brief remarks at this stage of our discussions on non-proliferation in order if possible to make a further contribution to the comparison of the two draft treaties (ENDC/152 and Add.1; ENDC/164). In this connexion I would recall that the need to examine the drafts in detail, article by article was first stressed in this Committee by the head of the Italian delegation at the beginning of the current session (ENDC/PV.236, p.8). It is therefore our duty and honour to demonstrate in concrete fashion the value of such a task.

At our meeting on 31 March the Czechoslovak representative concluded his speech -- whose moderate tone we appreciated even if we could not accept its reasoning -- by saying:

" ... there are no reasons for the Soviet Union to submit amendments to its original draft treaty, since the Western delegations have not yet stated their views on any of its basic articles, and especially articles I and II."

(ENDC/PV.253, p.10)

The Committee will remember that Ambassador Cavalletti expressed the hope that the Soviet delegation, following the example of the United States delegation, might improve its own text in the light of the remarks made during the discussion.

On the same day the Italian representative asked a number of questions about the text submitted by the Soviet Union. If I am not mistaken, they directly concerned articles I and II of the draft and other important aspects of the treaty. In their replies to various points yesterday and today, the Soviet and Polish delegations have shown that they have taken our delegation's remarks into consideration. Hence it seems worth while to continue the discussion in the hope that we shall thereby achieve some progress, despite the accusation made this morning that the Conference had reached a deadlock.

In his statement on 29 March the Soviet representative, Mr. Roshchin, criticized the United States amendments and referred in particular to associations of States (ENDC/PV.252, pp.5 et seq.). That is an important point because it also appears in the

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Soviet text, even if the wording is different. The Soviet delegate nevertheless found the United States provisions both unsatisfactory and ambiguous. He said in fact that it would be possible for alliances of nuclear States to replace a single nuclear State. In the first place it might be pointed out that the concept of an association is far broader than that of a mere alliance. Although alliances certainly exist whose organization may lead to close links between their member States by making these genuine associates, this is not always true of all alliances. However, we do not intend to embark on legal subtleties or semantic distinctions.

In our view the Soviet representative's remark concerns a fundamental question which is definitely and directly connected with non-proliferation. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, have already given a definite answer on this point by showing that there is no possibility of ambiguity in the United States provision to the effect that nuclear weapons should not be transferred to associations of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Western position on this point can be summed up as follows.

The draft treaty of the United States of America, as amended, provides that the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers should not take any action which would cause (a) an increase in the total number of States having control of nuclear weapons, or (b) the creation of associations of States which might be in a similar position. Since there are now no associations of States having control of such weapons -- and therefore there will be none at the signature of a treaty -- it is perfectly clear that the United States draft binds signatory countries to do all in their power to prevent such a possibility from arising in the future.

The Italian delegation therefore considers that this clarification which the United States of America has added fully meets the same requirement laid down by the Soviet Union in articles I and II of its draft. In consequence we hope that, instead of constituting an obstacle to an agreement, this improvement will help to reconcile the two drafts, which in fact was the reason why it was made. It also seems to us that this clarification is an extremely useful means of establishing at the same time the precise and logical limits of non-proliferation.

The aims pursued by various countries in their foreign policy may deserve the sympathy of others and yet reflect interests which are not strictly national. Nevertheless, we must not step outside our appointed aims, as we should if, for example, we tried to stop the course of history and tamper with the very principle of the sovereign right of States to determine their actions and their future. Such truly inalienable

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rights include the power to relinquish national sovereignty freely to a wider supra-national community. What we then have is not associations of States in the proper sense but genuine unions of States, which already exist in the international community and among the members of this Committee, as we can see in each of its three political groupings.

I should like to recall here the remarkably effective definition used by Lord Chalfont when he spoke of "the legitimate right to associate" (ENDC/PV.250, p.20). In some parts of the world there is more than this: a deep aspiration for integration in all fields. Ambassador Roshchin says that this is a hypothetical question. We are glad that he at least admits the hypothesis.

Yesterday Mr. Blusztajn told us during his speech (ENDC/PV.254, p.8) that he regarded such a trend in Europe as dangerous. We would reassure him, with all respect and in the spirit of friendship existing between our two countries, by saying that such trends answer to the need for greater European and world balance, for a strengthening of democracy on our continent, for general economic and social progress and, in a word, for peace.

In this context I should like to say that the criticisms of the Federal German document made by the Bulgarian representative seem to us completely out of place. How can one deny the constructive value of a document aimed solely at peace and satisfactory co-operation between nations, and proclaiming the German Government's firm intention to solve all the problems of peace, without exception, by a mutual effort of goodwill and understanding?

In our opinion that is the right path to follow in Europe and the other parts of the world. The attempt to hinder irresistible processes would be tantamount to turning the non-dissemination treaty into a kind of strait-jacket imposed on all countries, which would make the nuclear Powers untouchable idols and in fact prisoners of their own status, and would completely debar them from forming links with other nations. This would represent a departure from the realm of political negotiation to that of absurdity and myth. Like the fabled king who turned everything he touched into gold, the nuclear Powers would be unable to touch anything without nuclear consequences for other countries.

Furthermore, we must never forget that besides military activities there are peaceful ones which must be safeguarded. It would therefore be highly regrettable to encourage here the trend towards any form of exclusive exploitation of atomic energy, as Ambassador Correa do Lago eloquently reminded the Committee in his speech of 1 March (ENDC/PV.244, p.17).

(Mr. Tozzoli, Italy)

It is of course highly desirable to remove the nuclear danger completely, as the Soviet representative has said, but unfortunately, as has frequently been acknowledged, we have not yet reached that stage, and we must therefore concentrate on concrete questions and realistic limitations. In this connexion I should like to add a comment to the review of article I of the Soviet draft treaty already made by the head of the Italian delegation (ENDC/PV.252, pp.11 et seq.). The draft provides that a non-proliferation treaty must debar non-nuclear States from participating in the control of nuclear weapons or in their ownership or use. Here again the utmost precision is necessary in defining the significance of the terms employed in the draft treaty. Obviously what the Soviet Union really wants is to prevent collective participation between States -- that is participating which, if it is to have any meaning, can only be visualized as a sharing of powers on a footing of equality. It is only on this condition that, as Mr. Lukanov pointed out this morning, there would be any collective availability of nuclear weapons, since there is no question of giving or receiving shares for philanthropic purposes.

This reasoning corresponds to the facts of the situation and to the realities which must be faced in the draft treaties, I therefore think we are entitled to regard the right of participation denied by the Soviet draft as a collective right, because that is the only way in which a non-proliferation treaty could be violated. But in that case what is the difference between the formulas proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union? The definition given in the United States amendments leaves no doubt on the point, for it says "'Control' means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State". (ENDC/152/Add.1). This is yet another reason for hoping, not too confidently, that the Soviet delegation will carefully reconsider the wording used in defining the restrictions in its first two articles. As the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, has so rightly pointed out, the Soviet text would gain in clarity from the addition of definitions or revisions of its essential terms.

Such are the observations -- marginal, perhaps, but we hope not superfluous -- which my delegation wished to make today in a spirit of co-operation and with the aim of assisting the Committee in its task.

I would also take this opportunity of adding the Italian delegation's welcome to that expressed by the Chairman of this meeting to Mr. Jha, whose appeal we listened to with the deepest attention and respect.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Since no other representative wishes to speak, I shall make some brief remarks in my capacity as representative of the United States. Before doing so, however, I should like to add the congratulations of the United States to those which have already been addressed to the Soviet Union on its accomplishments in space. Perhaps I can express the hope that soon we at this Committee will be able to congratulate each other upon our successes around this table.

I listened with great interest to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union. His statement was closely reasoned, like all the statements of the representative of the Soviet Union, and for that reason a full response will not be forthcoming until after the United States delegation has been able to make a careful study of the verbatim record.

There is one aspect of the Soviet representative's statement on which I think a few remarks are appropriate at this time. There was one theme of reasoning in the Soviet representative's statement with which I find myself in respectful disagreement. He seemed to be arguing that the United States, in strengthening the element of control in its draft treaty and indicating its intentions regarding the retention of a veto over the use of nuclear weapons, is somehow acquiescing in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I had thought that rather the contrary conclusion might be drawn.

It is true, as the Soviet representative observed, that in my most recent remarks I pointed out that in considering the types of association that a nuclear weapon State might have with a non-nuclear weapon State we should deal with the most immediate possibility: an association in which a nuclear weapon State retains a veto over the use of its weapons (ENDC/PV.253, p.11). As the Soviet representative quite rightly pointed out, I did refer to testimony of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense before Committees of the United States Congress indicating that in the plans now under consideration it was contemplated that the United States veto would be retained. To me this seems to be an indication of greater control over nuclear weapons, not proliferation. We have made quite clear in the treaty amendments that we have submitted just what we mean by "control" -- and here I would again refer to paragraph (c) of the amended article IV, which states that -- "'Control means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State.'" (ENDC/152/Add.1, p.2) I think that the emphasis not only on the "right" but also on the "ability" to fire nuclear weapons may answer some of the questions which the Soviet representative put to us and to which we shall reply in more detail later.

(The Chairman, United States)

To return to the question of veto: the Soviet representative is of course quite correct in saying that the United States in exercising its veto will be guided by considerations of its national interest. That is true, and I assume that the Soviet Union also will be guided by considerations of its national interest in making its decisions with respect to its nuclear weapons. That is also true of every delegation around this table. The fact that it is a national interest does not mean that it is a short-range interest; it does not mean it is somehow a bad interest. All of us will, one hopes, be exercising our authority in the light of our long-range national interest, which in the case of the United States and the USSR is, I am sure, a long-range mutual interest in the preservation of peace and the avoidance of nuclear war.

As regards the references by the Soviet representative to the veto and his apparent concern that it is an inadequate method of dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, I would submit that my colleague did not deal adequately with the fact that in our previous presentations we indicated two ways by which a non-nuclear weapon State could obtain the ability to start a nuclear war -- and that is what we are trying to prevent. One way would be that the non-nuclear weapon State would obtain control over the nuclear weapons of a nuclear weapon State -- and I think I have said all I need to say on that this morning. The other way would be that the non-nuclear weapon State might manufacture its own weapons. In considering that possibility -- and we are certainly not oblivious to it -- we should examine the revised language in article I paragraph 2 (a, b), under which the nuclear weapon States would agree --

"Not to provide to any non-nuclear weapon State or association of such States --

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons." (ENDC/152/Add.1, p.1)

Our Soviet colleague expresses concern at what he refers to as physical access -- and here I might repeat the observation I made on 22 March (ENDC/PV.250, p.7) that the term "access" is not used in resolution 2028 (XX). To meet his concern I would respectfully submit -- and this is said in a spirit of friendship, not of contention -- that we should address ourselves to an undertaking whereby the nuclear weapon States would agree not to help a non-nuclear weapon State take the steps referred to in paragraph 2

(The Chairman, United States)

of article I, and whereby the non-nuclear weapon States would agree not to take the steps referred to in paragraph 2 of article II -- steps which, as Mrs. Myrdal pointed out (ENDC/PV.243, pp. 11, 12), precede the manufacture and the ultimate action which we all want to prevent: the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet representative expressed concern about nuclear escalation. In the United States we use a slang expression for it: "the slippery slope". I detected -- and I hope I am not putting words into his mouth -- a concern not so much about what we intended to do in any of these contexts, but that this might lead to something else, which in turn might lead to something further, and that we should arrive at a situation which he did not seem to find comfortable. And I must confess that I should not be comfortable either about the kind of situation he described. But my answer is that if we negotiate a treaty, the edge of that slope will be clearly delimited by solemn obligations undertaken by the parties to the treaty. We can view the "slippery slope" argument with that in mind.

That concludes the remarks I wished to make in my capacity as representative of the United States. I would only repeat that I shall study the Soviet representative's observations in the verbatim record and that the United States delegation will doubtless wish to comment further on them.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have taken the floor only in order to thank you for your congratulations to the Soviet Union on its success in creating an artificial satellite of the moon.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to read out to the Committee the following recommendation of the co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen wish to propose to the Committee that the next two meetings, the 256th and 257th, should be devoted to the discussion of collateral measures other than non-proliferation; that the 258th meeting should be devoted to discussion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; that the 259th meeting should also be devoted to this question if there are representatives wishing to speak on that subject; and that after this discussion on general and complete disarmament in one or two meetings, the next four meetings should be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, United States)

"This proposal is not intended to preclude the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any subject in any plenary meeting of the Committee."

If there is no objection, I shall declare that this proposal is adopted.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 255th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Italy and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 April 1966, at 3 p.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.